Mao Zedong once said, “If we want to destroy the enemy, we must have two kinds of wars: one is an open war, and the other is a covert war.”
It’s the second kind—the shadowy, silent battle waged through deception, infiltration, and manipulation—that has become a cornerstone of the Chinese Communist Party’s (CCP) strategic playbook.
Known as the “covert front,” this form of warfare is not fought on battlefields but within the institutions, alliances, and societies of adversary states.
Its purpose is to create internal chaos, erode trust, and weaken nations from within.
Nowhere is this tactic more evident than in Taiwan.
A Silent Offensive
Over the past year, Taiwan has witnessed a troubling rise in espionage cases implicating not just rogue actors on the fringe but sitting legislators, political aides, and retired military officials, including figures from the ruling Democratic Progressive Party (DPP).
The CCP is no longer merely watching from across the Strait; it’s already inside the house.
The CCP has moved well beyond traditional intelligence gathering. Its agents have reportedly funded and guided armed proxy groups tasked with preparing for “wartime internal support” operations—essentially sabotage and subversion from within if China ever launches an invasion.
Beijing, which sees Taiwan as a breakaway province to be brought under its control—by force if necessary—has ramped up military pressure alongside its covert operations.
But the growing wave of espionage cases suggests that China’s most immediate threat to Taiwan may not come from across the Strait but from within its own institutions.
Meanwhile, surveillance drones hover in the skies, monitoring Taiwan’s troop movements and feeding Beijing’s war planners a constant stream of battlefield intelligence.
This isn’t just intelligence gathering—it’s battlespace preparation. It’s a combination of political warfare, psychological warfare, and asymmetric warfare. The aim is to break a nation’s spine from within, using its own people, institutions, and divisions against it.
Espionage On The Rise
Chinese espionage operations in Taiwan are not only intensifying—they’re evolving. A recent surge in cases has alarmed security officials and revealed a worrying shift in Beijing’s tactics.
In January, Taiwan’s National Security Bureau (NSB) released a revealing document titled “Analysis on the Infiltration Tactics Concerning China’s Espionage Cases,” shedding light on how the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) is exploiting deep-rooted networks—especially within Taiwan’s military.
The numbers speak volumes. In 2021, Taiwan recorded just three prosecuted espionage cases. That number rose to five in 2022 before jumping sharply to 14 in 2023 and 15 in 2024. Over the past two years alone, 112 individuals were indicted—nearly triple the total of the two years prior.
What’s more alarming is the profile of those accused: in 2024, two-thirds of the defendants were either serving in the military or were retired personnel.
The data points to a clear pattern—the CCP is zeroing in on Taiwan’s defense establishment, treating it as a primary target for infiltration.
The CCP is targeting the armed forces with surgical precision, not only to extract secrets but to flip allegiances. Intelligence officials say Chinese handlers now demand ideological commitment—pressuring their Taiwanese assets to declare loyalty to Beijing and even support China in a future war.
This form of “cognitive warfare” is designed to fracture loyalties, dissolve identity, and embed sleeper agents deep within the ranks of Taiwan’s institutions.
Infiltration Beyond The Military
The CCP’s influence operations go far beyond military infiltration. Beijing’s networks are operating through criminal syndicates, shell companies, religious groups, underground banks, and diaspora community organizations.
Each plays a role in recruiting, grooming, and activating assets—often targeting those with previous security clearances or government access.
In response to a sharp escalation in espionage cases over the past two years, Taiwan’s President Lai Ching-te unveiled a sweeping 17-point national security initiative in March—an urgent countermeasure to what he described as a rising tide of infiltration by the Chinese Communist Party (CCP), which Taiwan officially designates as a “hostile external force.”
The initiative outlines a comprehensive strategy to defend against five major national security threats currently confronting Taiwan.
These include: China’s persistent challenge to Taiwan’s sovereignty, mounting infiltration and espionage activities targeting the island’s military, campaigns aimed at eroding the national identity of the Taiwanese people, united front operations disguised as cross-strait exchanges, and Beijing’s efforts to lure Taiwanese youth and business elites through the narrative of “integrated development.”
“China is not only bribing retired and active military officers to leak intelligence,” President Lai warned, “but even supporting the creation of armed cells willing to turn against their own nation. More alarmingly, Beijing is attempting to blur the very identity of our people—offering Chinese passports, residence permits, and identity cards to sow confusion and divide our sense of self.”
Lai’s remarks came in the wake of a string of criminal cases that have exposed how the CCP is working methodically to subvert Taiwan’s internal cohesion. These operations—spanning espionage, disinformation, economic enticement, and identity manipulation—are not isolated incidents but part of a broader playbook.
Together, they complement the more visible coercive tools of Chinese strategy, such as military drills and airspace violations, which have intensified since Lai took office in May.
Breaching The Political Core
Recent cases suggest that Taiwan’s most sensitive political circles are now within Beijing’s reach. At least five individuals linked to President Lai and National Security Council Secretary-General Joseph Wu are under investigation for allegedly leaking classified material to China.
One of them, Huang Chu-jung, used a military-grade encrypted messaging app to send travel schedules and campaign strategies to Chinese handlers, exposing not just information but also the vulnerability of Taiwan’s highest offices.
Military penetration has also deepened. In March, the Supreme Court upheld prison sentences for two ex-Air Force officers convicted of spying. Just a month earlier, eight other individuals, including active-duty officers, received sentences ranging from 18 months to 13 years for serving as Chinese informants.
What these cases reveal is chilling: the CCP’s campaign is not an external nuisance—it is a systemic infection reaching the top echelons of Taiwan’s defense and political leadership.
Security analysts warn that these revelations point to a long-term espionage network carefully cultivated by Beijing, one capable not only of collecting intelligence but also of compromising Taiwan’s command structure and critical infrastructure in a crisis.
A Warning From The Middle East
The shadow war is evolving. In Taipei, recent Israeli covert operations against Iran have sparked alarm—not for what they achieved, but for what they might inspire. Could China be watching and learning?
Israel’s sabotage missions and assassinations have showcased the power of covert action in weakening a rival without full-scale war. Experts in Taiwan now fear that Beijing could emulate these tactics—targeting infrastructure, key individuals, or communication systems with precision strikes masked as “accidents” or internal failures.
“What Israel has done to Iran—through a combination of precision, infiltration, and intelligence dominance—is something Beijing could try to replicate,” said Max Lo, executive director of the Taiwan International Strategic Study Society, in an interview with SCMP.
The implications are chilling. If Beijing were to adopt similar playbooks, future conflict scenarios might not begin with missile strikes or naval blockades but with targeted disruptions, sudden leadership decapitation attempts, or sabotage of key infrastructure—all carried out covertly before a formal war even begins.
A War That Has Already Begun
Taiwan’s defenders are preparing for a Chinese invasion. But in many ways, the battle is already underway. It is being fought in courtrooms, in briefing rooms, and on encrypted chat servers. It’s being waged by insiders—some unwitting, others willfully complicit.
The CCP’s aim is not simply conquest but collapse—from within. And if Taiwan fails to recognize that this silent war is already unfolding, it may find itself outmaneuvered not by brute force but by the very tools of deception and division that Mao Zedong once championed.
- Shubhangi Palve is a defense and aerospace journalist. Before joining the EurAsian Times, she worked for ET Prime. She has over 15 years of extensive experience in the media industry, spanning print, electronic, and online domains.
- Contact the author at shubhapalve (at) gmail.com
