NBC News, citing a senior Israeli intelligence official, reported that only about 65% of Iranian missiles were intercepted in the past 24 hours, significantly lower than the nearly 90% interception rate the day before.
Several other outlets have echoed NBC’s report.
Earlier, The New York Times reported that Iran had fired around 400 missiles, with nearly 40 evading interception and striking Israeli neighborhoods—implying a 90% interception rate.
The drop in interception rate coincides with reports from The Wall Street Journal and Newsweek highlighting concerns over Israel’s dwindling stockpile of Arrow missile interceptors.
Drop In Interception Rates
The decline in Israel’s interception rate could be due to its dwindling stockpile of interceptors, the use of more technically advanced missiles by Iran, or a combination of both.
In the first case, Israel may be conserving interceptors when an incoming missile is unlikely to hit a significant target, which would naturally lower the interception rate.
Impact of Iranian Hypersonic Missiles
Newsweek reports that Iran has deployed hypersonic missiles, which are particularly difficult to intercept due to their high speed and maneuverability. These missiles significantly reduce the time available for Israel’s air defense systems to respond.
A senior Israeli intelligence official confirmed that the hypersonic missiles have indeed shortened the response window for Israel’s air defense forces.
“If earlier we received a warning about a launch 10–11 minutes before impact, today’s morning attacks gave us only 6–7 minutes to prepare,” he said.
Use Of Multiple Warhead Missiles
Israel’s interception rate could drop further with Iran’s use of multiple-warhead missiles. BBC News and TRT Global reported that Iran used a missile carrying multiple warheads (submunitions) in one of its strikes. A video showing the submunitions striking targets was posted on social media.
In a post on X, Emanuel Fabian of The Times of Israel, citing the Israel Defense Forces (IDF) Home Front Command, wrote that the missile’s warhead dispersed at an altitude of approximately 23,000 feet (7 kilometers), releasing an estimated 20 submunitions. Each carried a 2.5-kilogram warhead and struck within a circular area about 16 kilometers in diameter.
Iran’s Khorramshahr-4 missile is known to be capable of carrying multiple warheads.
Submunitions are different from multiple independently targetable reentry vehicles (MIRVs). Submunitions are used to neutralize an area target, while MIRVs are used to strike targets that could be hundreds of miles apart.
Unlike MIRVs, which are released during the suborbital phase of a missile’s trajectory, submunitions are typically released during the terminal phase.
Small, short-range, high-speed interceptor missiles are required to engage submunitions, whereas large, long-range interceptors, such as Arrow 2 and Arrow 3, capable of reaching suborbital altitudes, are needed to engage MIRVs.
There is no conclusive evidence that Iran possesses MIRV technology.
The use of submunitions is likely aimed as much at depleting Israel’s stockpile of short-range interceptors as at ensuring that some submunitions strike the intended target area.
Electronic Warfare
Another possible reason for the reduced effectiveness of Israel’s missile defense could be Iran’s use of electronic warfare (EW).
On June 16, Iran’s Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC) claimed that during the latest wave of missile strikes on Israel, they had employed “new methods” that caused Israeli air defense systems to attack one another.
Tasnim News Agency quoted the IRGC as saying: “During this operation, thanks to the use of new methods and capabilities in intelligence and equipment, the enemy’s multi-layered defense command and control systems failed and began to attack each other.”
You can read our detailed analysis of this sensational claim in an earlier post.
While the veracity of the Iranian claim is open to question, it is technically possible to steer air defense missiles off course by spoofing an interceptor’s command uplink signals.
However, no definitive, publicly available visual evidence shows fratricide—friendly fire between different layers of Israel’s air defense systems, such as Iron Dome, David’s Sling, or Arrow, during the June 2025 conflict with Iran.
The video posted online in support of the Iranian claim at best shows Arrow interceptors veering off course. That said, Iran has demonstrated notable electronic warfare and GPS spoofing capabilities in the past, most famously in December 2011, when it captured a U.S. RQ-170 Sentinel stealth drone near Kashmar, allegedly through GPS spoofing.
Depletion Of Interceptor Stocks
Israel’s multi-tiered air defense architecture—comprising Iron Dome, David’s Sling, and the Arrow missile system—employs advanced interceptors designed to counter a wide spectrum of aerial threats, from short-range rockets to exo-atmospheric ballistic missiles.
Iron Dome is optimized for short-range threats (4–70 km), such as rockets and artillery shells.
David’s Sling is designed to intercept medium- to long-range rockets, cruise missiles, and some ballistic missiles (40–300 km).
The Arrow missile system, with its Arrow 2 and Arrow 3 interceptors, is designed to counter medium- and long-range ballistic missile threats.
Arrow 2 engages short-to-medium-range ballistic missiles in the upper atmosphere (up to ~500 km). It uses radar-guided interceptors with proximity-fused warheads that detonate near incoming threats.
Arrow 3 provides the outermost layer, targeting exo-atmospheric ballistic missiles (up to ~1,500 km). It uses a kinetic kill vehicle, guided by advanced radar, for direct-impact (hit-to-kill) interception in space.
The Arrow system was jointly funded and developed by Israel and the United States, beginning in 1986, and has undergone continuous improvement since then.
If Israel’s interception rate of Iranian missiles has indeed dropped from about 90% to 65% in the 24 hours prior to June 20, 2025—and the drop is due to a shortage of interceptors—then it is likely the Arrow 2 and Arrow 3 interceptors are in short supply.
Arrow System Manufacturing Constraints
The Arrow 2 interceptor’s manufacturing process reportedly involves both Israel Aerospace Industries (IAI) and Boeing. It requires specialized components and rigorous testing, slowing output. The process is susceptible to supply chain constraints.
Each Arrow 2 interceptor costs approximately $1.5–3 million, making mass production expensive.
Conclusion
It would be premature to conclude that Israel’s ballistic missile interception rate has dropped based solely on statements from a single source and a 24-hour subset of data.
However, if the interception rate has indeed declined, it could be the result of a combination of factors: limited interceptor stocks, advances in Iranian missile technology, and operational constraints.
Without specific data on Arrow 2 stockpile levels or confirmed interception failures, it is too early to attribute any drop solely to a shortage of Arrow 2 interceptors.
That said, given multiple reports hinting at shortages—and considering the challenges involved in manufacturing Arrow 2 and Arrow 3 interceptors—there is legitimate cause for concern for Israel.
- Vijainder K Thakur is a retired IAF Jaguar pilot, author, software architect, entrepreneur, and military analyst.
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