How much has the just concluded summit between President Donald Trump and President Lee Jae Myung at Washington led to the making of “the US-ROK (Republic of Korea, official name of South Korea) Alliance into a future-oriented and comprehensive strategic alliance’ by modernizing “the Alliance in a mutually beneficial manner in the face of an evolving regional security environment”?
Many strategic analysts were seeking a clear answer to this question during the newly elected South Korean President’s first visit to the White House, following the impeachment of former conservative President Yoon Suk-yeol.
However, that does not seem to be the case, as headlines are dominated by Trump’s willingness to meet North Korean leader Kim Jong-un before the end of the year, and that too at the Asia-Pacific Economic Cooperation (APEC) Summit in South Korea later this year.
And as if this was not enough, in a sharp departure from the agreement that has long governed the U.S. military on the Korean peninsula for decades, Trump now wants America to “own” some South Korean territories to be used for American bases in the region.
It seems that for Trump, South Korea is now under his global radar after Panama, Canada, Greenland, and Gaza for pursuing the “Land for America” policy.
It is worth noting that the United States has a defense treaty with South Korea, known as the “Mutual Defense Treaty Between the United States and the Republic of Korea” (1953).
Under this treaty, the US maintains about 28,500 (earlier there were 40,000) US military personnel based in South Korea (more than in any foreign country other than Germany and Japan) and prepares those personnel to defend the latter in response to any significant attack, ostensibly from North Korea.
In operationalizing this treaty, both the U.S. and South Korea have introduced periodic changes to its key features over the years. In recent times, the two countries have been expecting each other to make certain additional changes in the scope and nature of their security alliance.
Some prominent ones in this regard, which were debated on the eve of the Trump-Lee summit, are the following:
The U.S. and South Korea have a Special Measures Agreement (SMA) on defense cost-sharing. Washington, particularly under Trump, wants that to be revised upwards, with Seoul contributing toward it. In fact, the Trump Administration wants South Korea to spend 5 percent of its GDP on defense, something it insists its NATO allies do.
Seoul currently spends about 2.8 percent of its GDP and appears prepared to increase it up to approximately 3.5 percent, but it would not like to be dictated to, as this challenges its sovereign power.
Reportedly, South Korea covers labor costs for USFK’s (US Forces in Korea) Korean employees, construction expenses for military facilities, and logistical support for military operations — all under the framework of the SMA.
In 2021, it had agreed to pay 1.18 trillion won (approximately $1.03 billion USD at the time) for the cost-sharing of US troops stationed in the country, representing a 13.9% increase in its contribution. It is a contribution to the overall defense burden, not a direct payment of wages to individual soldiers.
Last year (2024), the two countries had tentatively agreed to a new deal covering the costs of maintaining the American military presence. Yet to be formally approved, the deal involves South Korea raising its contribution by 8.3% during the first year of the five-year agreement, to $1.125 billion. Additional increases, capped at 5% per year, would then be applied, it was said.
That tentative deal was made when Biden was the U.S. President. However, with the arrival of the Trump Administration, Washington is also said to be seeking to modernize the alliance further, so that Seoul focuses more on deterring North Korea—which includes increasing expenditures on national defense capabilities for deterrence—while Washington focuses more on China.
In other words, Seoul is asked to share Washington’s overall “security burden” in the region, and thus is named “burden sharing”, which would include Seoul spending more to strengthen its own capabilities.
This “burden sharing” is different from the SMA, which deals with the costs of hosting USFK.
Secondly, the Americans have been discussing the alliance as displaying what is called “strategic flexibility.” The argument here is that as an ally, South Korea should understand the rationale for the transformation of the U.S. global military strategy and respect the necessity for strategic flexibility of the U.S. forces on its soil to be engaged in any eventual regional operation, in general, and in Taiwan in particular, to defend the island from any aggression from China. This is all the more so, as China, in all probability, would be helped by North Korea, given that the two countries have a mutual defense treaty, the Sino-North Korean Mutual Aid and Cooperation Friendship Treaty, signed on July 11, 1961.
This treaty requires each country to provide immediate military and other assistance if it is attacked by a third party. The treaty, which is China’s only formal defense pact, has been renewed multiple times, most recently in 2021, and remains in effect.
According to Korean scholar Duyeon Kim, the U.S. rationale behind seeking alliance modernization and strategic flexibility is that USFK, which has deterred successfully the North Korean threats for years, South Korean forces in the alliance need to contribute to America’s central security challenge too (i.e., China). After all, the two countries have a Mutual Defense Treaty, not a unilateral one.
For the Americans, the treaty, which provides the legal and fundamental framework for US troops stationed in South Korea, does not specify North Korea as the “potential aggressor”.
Nor does it specify any aggressor against which the allies must deter armed attack. Established on November 7, 1978, the ROK/U.S. Combined Forces Command (CFC) is the warfighting headquarters. Its role is to deter, or defeat if necessary, outside aggression against the ROK. This means that the mission of USFK is not limited to deterring and defending US allies against North Korea alone.
But this rationale does not seem to be shared by the South Koreans. They do not want to get entangled in the Taiwan issue, as that would lead Beijing to view Seoul as an “enemy”.
After all, China is their key trading partner. Besides, Seoul fears that any transfer of the forces in South Korea, howsoever small, to any outside theater could provide North Korea an opportunity to provoke or even invade the South again.
Besides, it would not only invite greater Russian involvement in military cooperation with North Korea but could also bring Beijing and Pyongyang closer together to counter a growing mutual threat. In other words, a strengthened North Korea–China–Russia bloc could emerge from such changes.
Therefore, South Korea has been reluctant to openly discuss any role in the event of Taiwan Strait contingencies. In fact, some South Korean politico-military elites demand a revision of the CFC agreement to transfer wartime military operational control of the alliance back to a South Korean commander.
If a conflict situation, such as the invasion of Taiwan, were to take place with a US commander still in charge of South Korea’s military during wartime, South Korea could not only be forced into a war against China but also potentially become a sitting duck for a potential attack from Pyongyang, so runs their argument.
It may be noted that the CFC has operational control over more than 600,000 active-duty military personnel of all services, of both countries. In wartime, augmentation could involve approximately 3.5 million ROK reservists, as well as additional U.S. forces deployed from outside the ROK.
If North Korea were to attack, the CFC would provide a coordinated defense through its Air, Ground, Naval, and Combined Marine Forces Component Commands, as well as the Combined Unconventional Warfare.
The CFC is commanded by a four-star U.S. general, with a four-star ROK Army general as deputy commander. Throughout the command structure, binational manning is readily apparent: if the chief of a staff section is Korean, the deputy is American and vice versa.
This integrated structure is also present within the component commands and the headquarters. All CFC components are tactically integrated through continuous combined and joint planning, training, and exercises. South Koreans would now like to reexamine this arrangement that has been in place since 1978.
On all the above issues, neither Trump nor Lee has revealed anything substantial about the alliance after their meeting on Monday (August 25), although the South Korean sounded more optimistic and accommodating than his host in their post-meeting interactions with the press.
Speaking at the Center for Strategic and International Studies (CSIS), a prominent policy think tank in Washington, D.C., Lee emphasized that South Korea would assume a more proactive role in maintaining security on the Korean Peninsula.
“First, we will increase our defense budget. The additional resources will be used to acquire advanced technologies and assets to build a smart, strong military capable of prevailing in the wars of the 21st century”.
He then added, “President Trump and I agreed (during the summit) to update the [South] Korea-U.S. alliance so that it becomes more reciprocal and forward-looking. America’s defense commitment to [South] Korea and our combined deterrence posture will remain ironclad.”
Significantly, when asked about Seoul’s position between the US and China, the South Korean President acknowledged Korea’s past dual-track approach — relying on Washington for security and Beijing for trade — but said that paradigm no longer holds.
“As the global supply chain realigns and US policy toward China becomes more defined, Korea cannot maintain the same stance as before,” he said. “We remain within the US-led framework, while maintaining only essential, practical ties with China due to our proximity.”
However, in contrast to his South Korean counterpart, Trump caused a stir during their summit by suggesting that Washington could seek ownership of land used for American bases in Korea. This remark, made at the White House after nearly two hours of discussions, marked a sharp departure from the agreement that has long governed the U.S. military presence on the peninsula for decades.
While telling reporters that America and South Korea are “friends”, he moved on to the issue of bases, adding, “They would say, ‘but we gave you land.’ I said, ‘No, you didn’t. You lease us land.’ There’s a big difference between giving and leasing. Maybe one of the things I’d like to do is ask them to give us ownership of the land where we have the big fort.”
His use of the word “fort” underscored Trump’s blunt style when it comes to framing matters of alliance. All these years, U.S. forces have used South Korean facilities on a lease basis and are supposed to return them when no longer needed.
Trump’s comment appeared to contradict these longstanding arrangements, raising concerns about adding uncertainty to already delicate negotiations over defense cost sharing. However, that appears to be becoming a new trend in Trump’s second-term presidency – embarrassing America’s allies and partners, both new and old.
- Author and veteran journalist Prakash Nanda is Chairman of the Editorial Board of the EurAsian Times and has been commenting on politics, foreign policy, and strategic affairs for nearly three decades. He is a former National Fellow of the Indian Council for Historical Research and a recipient of the Seoul Peace Prize Scholarship.
- CONTACT: prakash.nanda (at) hotmail.com
